Ventus Energy took €82 million from retail investors without a licence, until Germany’s financial oversight authority Bafin ordered it to stop and immediately repay all German investors. Now it offers a restructuring plan as the alternative to bankruptcy.
It asks its retail investors for two things:
- Don’t sue us for what we owe you.
- Leave the same people in charge.
What they promise:
- all their money back.
Sounds good. Except for one tiny problem:
Ventus can pay investors as little as 2 cents on the euro, and lenders can’t force a bankruptcy until 2029. So for under €1 million, they can postpone bankruptcy by at least two years. Which is pretty convenient, considering they are allowed to spend €3.8 million on operations of the platform in the same two years.
But in theory people could get their money back?
The repayment rests on an unbuilt power plant valued at eight times its current worth, revenue magically jumping up after a massive state subsidy runs out, and a valuation that books more than €9 million from a company that doesn’t even exist yet. And the plan leaves the people who spent the money in charge of getting it back.
So, yeah, in theory.
Leaving the land of imagination: I see little reason to believe investors will get much more than those 2 cents for every euro they are owed. Not in two years. Not in five. Not ever, once this plan is in place.
If you already know you oppose the plan, do three things:
- Vote no in the creditor portal by 12 October.
- Email your written position to [email protected] by 12 October. Without it you lose the right to challenge the plan in court.
- Save a copy of the plan from the portal before 12 October, and get your court application ready. If the plan passes the vote, it is due by 19 October.
The steps are explained in a separate guide: https://www.karsten.me/money/ventus-voting-no-objection-guide/
If you’re not quite ready for that, read on.
Documents obtained by the author: the plan’s §§1.2–1.5, 2.1, 3.1.3, 7.1.2, 7.2.3–7.2.5, 9 and 11.1; Annexes 3, 4 and 7.
Sources: https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/akt/501122025005; https://www.bafin.de/SharedDocs/Veroeffentlichungen/DE/Verbrauchermitteilung/unerlaubte/2026/meldung_2026_05_18_ventus_energy_group.html; https://ventus.energy/uploads/Juglas_Jauda_valuation.pdf; https://www.rocketbtc.com/privacy; https://www.rocketbtc.com/risk-disclosure; https://www.ametlikudteadaanded.ee/ee/Saneerimisn%C3%B5ustaja%20Kristo%20Teder/saneerimismenetluse-teated/saneerimiskava-projekti-teade/2026/9/24/2653915; https://www.ametlikudteadaanded.ee/ee/Saneerimisn%C3%B5ustaja%20Kristo%20Teder/saneerimismenetluse-teated/saneerimisteade/2026/8/25/2640998
Update 9 October 2026: after a reader’s question I added a paragraph on what the €80.0 million may be and restated the recovery ratio against each of Ventus’s figures. No figure quoted from Ventus’s documents has changed.
Executive Summary
- An unbuilt power plant called Atlasa is valued at 8x what it is worth today: €40 million instead of €5 million. That €35 million jump is supposed to happen on a fraction of a €12.2 million building budget for all projects together. Ventus presented several scenarios, from best to worst. That one asset going up 8x? It’s not the best case. It happens in every presented case.
- Ventus’s most profitable plant gets a state subsidy of €2.29 million a year. It runs out next year. No problem. The revenue forecast, built on Ventus’s own numbers, simply jumps 64%. Magic.
- The plan expects Ventus’s operations to throw off €31.5 million of spare cash in five years. One problem: the twelve Ventus companies that filed 2025 accounts made €2 million in profit between them. Take out the subsidy that ends next year and it is a loss of about €275,000. It takes a long time to reach €31.5 million at minus €275,000 a year.
- Ventus gave itself the right to pay the worst-case schedule, with a 15% grace range on top and twelve months to catch up. That means paying investors less than 2 cents for every euro owed until the end of 2028. That is all it takes to keep lenders from forcing a bankruptcy before 2029. Ventus’s own plan says it is not a material breach as long as it pays you €58 on every €10,000 it owes you. Not per month. In the entire first year. Pay €57 and you finally have something to take to a judge.
- In that first year, all 6,136 lenders together are due €575,000. The CEO’s company alone took in €574,819 last year. In other words: as long as six thousand investors get as much as Henrijs Jansons’s company took in, Ventus is not in breach of its plan.
- €9.36 million of the income behind the €45 million future valuation of Jugla, Ventus’s biggest plant, is coming from a company that doesn’t exist yet. Ventus supplied the forecast and the appraiser signed off on that. What the fuck?
- Ventus’s plan says it lent its projects €80.0 million. Its own asset list, for a date 17 days later, shows €65.0 million in loans and unpaid interest. That is €15.0 million apart, and the plan has no line that reconciles the two. Both numbers are Ventus’s.
- Krustpils is the plan’s second-biggest gain: €4 million today, €18 million on completion. Nine days before Ventus filed for restructuring, every share and every asset of the Krustpils company was pledged to an outside company.
- Ventus offered influencers money on the understanding that part of it went back into Ventus as their “own” stake. Influencers were asked to keep the money in and give status updates. Fake skin in the game. But they still get to vote in the restructuring because on paper they are investors.
- Overheads are budgeted at about €1.9 million a year, and they get paid before investors do. Over 2027 and 2028 that is €3.8 million for running Ventus, the adviser’s fee for coming up with this “plan” included. What Ventus can have paid lenders before anyone can call a breach: less than €1 million. Four for them, one for you.
- The “objective” adviser? An hourly fee if the plan is rejected (estimate: €43,680). If it is approved, Estonia’s fee scale sets a floor and a ceiling on his fee at a percentage of all promised money (on paper up to €2,181,147), unless he and Ventus agreed something else. The court can go below the floor if it is out of proportion to his work. The plan doesn’t show their deal. And yes, the percentage is based on ‘promised’, not ‘paid’.
- The case for bankruptcy, in short:
- A trustee is paid a share of what he recovers, not of what he promises.
- He can undo insider deals that hurt creditors, five years back.
- He can sue the management even if the company has waived its claims.
- The plan does the opposite: it leaves Jānis Timma, who owns 65% of Ventus, and Jansons to collect from themselves, lets the five-year clock on claims against them run down and, once approved, the law protects payments made to carry out the plan from being clawed back just for hurting creditors.
Documents obtained by the author: Annexes 1–8; the plan’s §§1.2, 2.1, 3.1.3, 3.2.1, 6.3, 7.2.5, 7.2.8, 9 and 11.1–11.2; available 2025 annual accounts and the author’s saved accounts records for the twelve project companies; 2025 annual accounts and ownership records of WIN WIN Investments; Lursoft commercial-pledge records for PJ Serviss, as transcribed on 10 September 2026; a Ventus collaboration offer.
Sources: https://company.lursoft.lv/en/powerhouse-atlasa/40203480254, paywalled; https://ventus.energy/uploads/Juglas_Jauda_valuation.pdf; https://www.rocketbtc.com/privacy; https://www.rocketbtc.com/risk-disclosure; https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/akt/501122025005; https://www.riigiteataja.ee/akt/101072022028; https://www.riigiteataja.ee/akt/114032025017; https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/ee/509012023001/consolide/current; https://www.riigiteataja.ee/kohtulahendid/detailid.html?id=364453119; https://ventus.energy/en/about-us; https://archive.li/2025.11.25-163444/https://passives-einkommen-mit-p2p.de/en/ventus-energy-review/
The 2 cents at the top is what Ventus can get away with paying before lenders can force a bankruptcy. My number for what investors see in the end is 5% of their outstanding principal. I would be surprised if it is more. Ventus’s own project list shows €80.0 million of loans to its project companies. Its own liquidation model puts €56.8 million against that, and €24.2 million of the €56.8 million is a single plant whose appraisal I take apart below. Most of the remaining values are management’s own. And the plan sets up no review of the money that has already been paid out.
Documents obtained by the author: Annexes 4, 5 and 7; the plan’s §7.3.1.
Source: https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/akt/501122025005
What happens if Ventus doesn’t pay
While a confirmed plan is in force, you can’t sue Ventus on your claim and you can’t file for its bankruptcy on it. What the Act offers is revocation: the court revokes a plan the company fails to perform “to a material extent”. After a revocation your claim is restored, less whatever you were paid, and bankruptcy can follow. So how far behind does Ventus have to fall?
Source: https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/akt/501122025005
The plan answers that for itself. Performance is tested every six months, on cumulative payments. A missed month is fine. Falling 10–15% behind the worst-case schedule is declared not to be a material breach, provided the gap is closed later. One clause gives Ventus twelve months to close it, another gives it six. Even the slippage allowance comes in two versions.
Document obtained by the author: the plan’s §§7.2.5 and 13.1.
The plan gives an example. After twelve months of payments, the worst case calls for €575,000 in total, 0.69% of all claims. Ventus pays €500,000 instead, and the plan says that is not a material breach. Use the whole 15% allowance and the line sits at €488,750. Below that, the plan stops calling the shortfall permissible. That is the first year’s floor for more than 6,100 lenders together: 0.58% of what they are owed. On a €10,000 claim it is €58.
Document obtained by the author: the plan’s §§4.3 and 7.2.5, worked example; Annex 4.
But isn’t there €2.2 million sitting at Paysera, almost four times as much? There is. The plan says most of it is your own wallet money. Then it warns you that a bankruptcy puts it in the pot. Your money when Ventus makes promises, Ventus’s money when it makes threats.
Document obtained by the author: the plan’s §§3.2.1, 6.3 and 6.4.
Now run the same rule forward. Ventus can pay under €1 million in total, say it will catch up, and not be in breach of its own plan until the review at the end of 2028. Here is why. The check at the end of May 2028 needs €998,750 from Ventus, for all lenders together. The one after it, six months later, is the first that can’t be passed without selling or refinancing something: the worst-case schedule has €3 million from a sale in October 2028. And even then somebody has to apply to the court, and the court has to find the failure material.
Document obtained by the author: the plan’s §§7.2.4, 7.2.5 and 13.1; Annex 4, Scenario D.
For all 6,136 lenders together that is under €1 million. You can enforce only what the plan’s own schedule says is due: on its worst case, a grand total of 5.6 cents per euro you are owed in the first two years.
Too many small numbers? Here they are in one place. The worst-case schedule pays 0.69 cents per euro owed in the first year. Ventus can pay 0.58 cents and still be inside its allowance: €58 on €10,000. Over the first two years the schedule says 5.6 cents. But Ventus can pay under €1 million, about 1.2 cents, and lenders can’t force a bankruptcy before the review at the end of 2028. That is the “2 cents” at the top. The 5% is my own guess at what investors get back in the end.
Document obtained by the author: Annex 4, Scenario D.
Source: https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/akt/501122025005
The plan has one more way out, and it is a telling one. You can offer to take less. You name a discount, and Ventus pays out the lenders who offer the biggest one first. In the worst case the minimum is 20%. For the first six months, 70% of any spare cash goes into this pot and not to the lenders who wait, and Ventus may dip into its €1 million reserve for it too. It feeds on itself. The less lenders believe they will be paid, the more of them offer a discount, and the deeper they have to go to reach the front of the queue. The cash leaves with the ones who quit. If Ventus fails after that, the ones who waited are left with what’s left.
Document obtained by the author: the plan’s §§7.2.8 and 8.2.
Henrijs Jansons sits on Ventus’s management board. His wholly owned company, WIN WIN Investments, holds 20% of Ventus. It reported turnover of €574,819 and a profit of €528,021 for 2025, up from turnover of €129,100 the year before. The accounts don’t name its customers, and a company’s profit is not its owner’s salary. Still: the amount Ventus must pay all of its lenders in the first year to stay inside its own allowance is less than one board member’s company reported as profit in a single year.
Documents obtained by the author: the plan’s §7.2.5; Annex 4.
Sources: https://company.lursoft.lv/lv/020343681, paywalled; https://ariregister.rik.ee/eng/company/16964065/Ventus-Energy-Group-O%C3%9C
All principal back, eventually
The plan lists €83.89 million of restructured claims, €65.56 million of it principal. The other €18.33 million is interest that accrued and was never paid out. Scenarios A and B repay all principal and all recognised interest. C pays half the interest. D, the worst case, pays none. On the plan’s own calendar, D also pays nothing in 2026 and €675,000 in total by the end of 2027. That is one cent per euro of principal. The other ninety-nine come later.
Document obtained by the author: the plan’s §§7.2–7.3; Annex 4.
The plan has four scenarios, from “accelerated” to “minimum”, and says itself that all four run on the same forecast. The only difference is when the assets get sold and for how much. Atlasa at €40 million sits underneath every one of them. Even the so-called worst case needs €57.4 million from selling or refinancing assets, more than half of it in the final month.
Documents obtained by the author: the plan’s §§7.2.4 and 7.3.1; Annexes 4 and 7.
From where? The plan’s own forecast has operations producing about €31.5 million after overheads and investment. The rest has to come from selling or refinancing assets. Scenario A requires a binding deal to sell or refinance the heat portfolio, pencilled in at about €60 million. Scenarios B to D don’t name the asset. Who has committed to buying Atlasa for €40 million?
Document obtained by the author: the plan’s §§7.2.4, 10.5 and 11.2.
Source: https://ventus.energy/en/news/reorganisation-plan-executive-summary-for-creditors/
And how much do the operations make today? I added up every Ventus project company in Latvia that has filed accounts for 2025. Twelve companies. Together they reported a profit of €2,014,625. One of them, Jugla, gets a state subsidy that ends in mid-2027. Take the subsidy out and the twelve lose about €275,000.
| Company | 2025 profit | Subsidy (ends mid-2027) | Profit without subsidy |
|---|---|---|---|
| Juglas Jauda (Jugla) | €2,768,669 | about €2,290,000 | about €478,669 |
| Eco Energy Riga (Dambis) | €934,995 | none | €934,995 |
| VCHP | €71,652 | none found | €71,652 |
| CS Smiltene | €70,948 | none found | €70,948 |
| Powerhouse Atlasa | €20,220 | none | €20,220 |
| Smiltenes ESO | €644 | none found | €644 |
| Liepmeži | −€4,136 | none | −€4,136 |
| PJ Serviss (Krustpils) | −€28,701 | none | −€28,701 |
| Solar BESS Valmiera | −€196,471 | none found | −€196,471 |
| Powerhouse Daugavpils | −€453,492 | none | −€453,492 |
| BESS Park Jelgava (15 months) | −€478,721 | none | −€478,721 |
| Solar Park Kuldiga (15 months) | −€690,982 | none | −€690,982 |
| Total | €2,014,625 | about €2,290,000 | about −€275,375 |
Is that everything? No. I found no 2025 accounts for the parent, its Estonian holding companies, the three Lithuanian wind companies or the project companies founded since August 2025. Jugla’s valuation gives no subsidy figure for 2025, so I used the €2.29 million it gives for 2026. “None found” means the accounts data I have shows no subsidy line. And profit is not cash. With all of that said: a group that was in profit last year only because of a subsidy that is about to end is supposed to produce €31.5 million of spare cash in five years. How?
Documents obtained by the author: 2025 annual accounts of the twelve companies, Lursoft extracts of August and October 2026; the plan’s §11.2; Annex 3.
Source: https://ventus.energy/uploads/Juglas_Jauda_valuation.pdf
Atlasa: €35 million of optimism
By Ventus’s own description, Atlasa today is a set of engineering plans for a 55 MW energy complex and 4 MW of boiler equipment that hasn’t been built into anything. Ventus values that at €5 million. The €40 million is for the finished complex: biomass boilers, a gas-fired heat-and-power unit, an electrode boiler and heat storage. That complex exists on paper.
Document obtained by the author: Annex 7, Atlasa row.
So what does it cost to build, and who pays? The package sent to creditors doesn’t say. It contains no Atlasa construction budget, no funding schedule and no earnings calculation behind the €40 million. The cash-flow forecast shows €12.16 million of development spending for the entire group over 61 months, with no breakdown by project. Management supplied the value. The independent valuation turns up after you’ve voted.
Document obtained by the author: Annex 8, pp. 3–4; Annex 7; Annex 3, pp. 1, 3, 5 and 7.
The plan also says in writing that it involves no new financing. So an unbuilt power plant is meant to become eight times as valuable on a fraction of a €12.2 million building budget for every project put together. That’s not ordinary-delusional. That’s “Mit dem Angriff Steiners wird das alles in Ordnung kommen” delusional.
Documents obtained by the author: the plan’s §5.3; Annexes 3 and 7.
Would I stake my repayment on that eightfold development uplift with the calculations missing?
I sure as fuck wouldn’t.
Now look at what the group has already put in. Ventus lists €11,288,792 in group loans to Atlasa. It values the asset at €5 million. Take off €850,000 owed to outside parties and €4.15 million is left: 37 cents for every euro lent. Ventus’s own bankruptcy model is harsher. It assumes a sale at half price and gets €1.65 million back. Fifteen cents on the euro, by Ventus’s arithmetic.
Document obtained by the author: Annex 5, p. 2.
Atlasa’s last filed accounts, for the end of 2025, show €5.4 million in plant and advances, €1.5 million lent on to companies they don’t name and €15,559 in the bank.
Documents obtained by the author: 2025 annual accounts of Powerhouse Atlasa, Lursoft extract; the plan’s annexes, including Annex 5, Atlasa entry.
Source: https://company.lursoft.lv/en/powerhouse-atlasa/40203480254, paywalled
That is the first answer to where the money went. Ventus shows €11.3 million owed by Atlasa against an asset it values at €5 million. The Land Register records €800,000 for the plot. What the €6.3 million gap consists of, and who received it, the plan doesn’t say.
Source: https://www.lursoft.lv/en/land-register, paywalled
Document obtained by the author: Annexes 5 and 7, Atlasa rows.
Atlasa is the one project trusted with the plan’s biggest gain. Add Krustpils, which goes from €4 million to €18 million, and two development projects valued by management supply 85% of the increase.
Document obtained by the author: Annex 7, project values and portfolio totals.
Source: https://ventus.energy/en/news/reorganisation-plan-executive-summary-for-creditors/
Three more ways to make a portfolio look bigger
The plan values its projects at €110.2 million today. By the plan’s own group table, Ventus holds 22.353% of the company that owns the Dambis plant. The plan counts Dambis at 100% of its €12 million value anyway and says so in writing.
Document obtained by the author: the plan’s §§3.1.3, 3.2.2 and 3.3.2.
For the crypto-mining equipment, the Ventspils project and a battery pilot, the plan uses the amount invested as the value: €10.7 million in total. Spend a euro, own a euro. If valuation worked like that, no investment would ever lose money.
Document obtained by the author: the plan’s §3.2.2; Annex 7.
Only two of the energy projects have an independent valuation, Jugla and Dambis. The rest are management estimates, most with an independent valuation expected at the end of 2026 or in the first quarter of 2027.
Document obtained by the author: Annex 7, valuation timing; Annex 8, pp. 3–4.
How much room does all of that leave? The plan does the sum itself. Projects worth €110.2 million, less about €15 million of senior loans at the project companies, leaves about €95 million. Ventus owes €86.0 million. Then the plan counts Dambis at the 22.353% it actually holds, and its own figure drops to about €90 million. That is about €4 million of room on €110.2 million of valuations, most of them management’s own. If the projects are worth about 4% less than management says, Ventus owes more than it owns. The three items valued at cost come to €10.7 million on their own.
Document obtained by the author: the plan’s §§3.2.2 and 3.3.2.
Source: https://ventus.energy/en/news/reorganisation-plan-executive-summary-for-creditors/
Jugla loses its subsidy and grows 64% anyway
Jugla is the big one: a heat-and-power plant in Riga operated by Juglas Jauda. In Ventus’s own bankruptcy model it accounts for €24.2 million of the €56.8 million the project companies are supposed to return. Valuation firm Interbaltija puts its equity, the value left for the owner after the plant’s debts, at €36.7 million as it runs today and €45 million in a future scenario. So how solid is the €36.7 million?
Source: https://ventus.energy/uploads/Juglas_Jauda_valuation.pdf
Document obtained by the author: Annex 5, p. 2.
Jugla’s subsidy ends in mid-2027. The forecast removes it: €2.29 million in 2026, €1.14 million in 2027, zero in 2028. Then it projects 2028 revenue of €13.11 million, against €8.01 million actually earned in 2025. Lose the subsidy, grow 64%.
Source: https://ventus.energy/uploads/Juglas_Jauda_valuation.pdf
How? The heat-and-power unit is supposed to run 2,000 hours a year, up from 1,200. The plant sells more boiler heat, picks up new income for helping keep the power grid in balance, and sells its electricity in selected peak hours at around €170 per megawatt-hour (MWh). On page 22 the appraiser records that its client had not updated the price statistics it supplied, and that it was told similar peaks still exist. The report doesn’t say who gave the assurance.
Source: https://ventus.energy/uploads/Juglas_Jauda_valuation.pdf
The €45 million future scenario adds €2.34 million a year from RocketBTC from 2027 to 2030. RocketBTC is supposed to install server racks, cooling and power equipment at the plant. As of 5 October, its own privacy and risk pages describe the Swiss company as still in formation. Its homepage says the preview runs on simulated data and that its data centres are being prepared for launch. In the public valuation PDF, the appendix for the sales contract is a heading with nothing under it.
Sources: https://ventus.energy/uploads/Juglas_Jauda_valuation.pdf; https://www.rocketbtc.com/privacy; https://www.rocketbtc.com/risk-disclosure; https://www.rocketbtc.com/
Who is RocketBTC? In March, Ventus told its own promoters. A message to its “ambassadors” on 16 March 2026 says Ventus will have no stand at the INVEST fair in Stuttgart, because a stand could be read as advertising a financial product while it is talking to Bafin. The stand goes to “our partner ROCKET BTC”, whose product, the message says, will be finished shortly. Seventeen days later the appraiser signed a valuation that books €2.34 million a year from that partner.
Document obtained by the author: a copy of Ventus’s message to its ambassadors of 16 March 2026.
In April, RocketBTC’s privacy policy gave a Swiss company number. Let me look that up. CHE-XXX.XXX.XXX. That is what it said. X’s and all. Oh. A company with X’s where its register number should be. Then that company and one other name went up over Ventus’s stand at the INVEST fair in Stuttgart. Ventus says it stepped aside. INVEST told me it kicked Ventus out after Bafin said it was investigating. I was there. Who was standing under the RocketBTC sign? You guessed it: Jansons.
Source: https://archive.md/20260410002129/https://rocketbtc.com/privacy
Documents obtained by the author: a copy of RocketBTC’s privacy policy as archived on 10 April 2026; the author’s question to Messe Stuttgart of 20 May 2026 and Messe Stuttgart’s reply of 21 May 2026.
Strip all of that away and one thing is left. The company doesn’t exist yet, and the valuation counts on €9.36 million from it: €2.34 million a year for four years.
Sources: https://www.rocketbtc.com/privacy; https://www.rocketbtc.com/risk-disclosure; https://ventus.energy/uploads/Juglas_Jauda_valuation.pdf
So where do RocketBTC’s numbers come from? The appraiser says it himself: “according to the Client’s estimate”. The client is Ventus. No contract in the report. The appendix where one should be is an empty page. The passage even still carries somebody’s note to the appraiser: “[2025 data is being compiled, we will submit it for preparation]”. In the published report. Ventus guessed what a company that doesn’t exist will pay Ventus’s own plant, and the appraiser wrote it down. €9.36 million from a company that doesn’t exist yet. The appraisal Ventus published even shows what that does to the plant’s value: €8.3 million more in the scenario with RocketBTC than without it.
Sources: https://ventus.energy/uploads/Juglas_Jauda_valuation.pdf; https://www.rocketbtc.com/privacy; https://www.rocketbtc.com/risk-disclosure
Now try following Jugla through the restructuring documents. The appraiser has €36.7 million and €45 million. The plan lists €36.7 million now and €40 million later, and carries a separate crypto-mining entry of €7.02 million, half of it described as an addition at Jugla. How do €45 million, €40 million and the crypto entry fit together? The plan doesn’t say. I can’t tell you whether the crypto income is counted once or twice, because nothing in the package shows where it sits.
Source: https://ventus.energy/uploads/Juglas_Jauda_valuation.pdf
Document obtained by the author: the plan’s §3.2.2 and Annex 7, Jugla and crypto entries.
The plan never mentions RocketBTC. It lists “Crypto mining Smiltene (operational) and Jugla (development)” as Ventus’s own project and values it at €7,019,694, the amount of lenders’ money put into it. The appraiser has an outside company building the server hall and paying Jugla €2.34 million a year. Which is it? If lenders’ €7 million paid for the mining, what is RocketBTC bringing, and why would it pay rent?
Document obtained by the author: the plan’s §3.2.2; Annex 7, crypto-mining entry.
Source: https://ventus.energy/uploads/Juglas_Jauda_valuation.pdf
One more thing about that €36.7 million. The appraiser calls it equity value: what is left for the owner after the plant’s debts. The plan drops it into a list of project values, and the bankruptcy model then deducts external loans and buy-out obligations. Was Jugla’s debt taken off twice?
Source: https://ventus.energy/uploads/Juglas_Jauda_valuation.pdf
Document obtained by the author: Annexes 5 and 7, aggregation and debt deductions.
The €36.7 million also contains an IOU from Ventus. On page 8 the appraiser lists a €0.94 million loan from the plant to VENTUS Electricity and Heat 1 OÜ. That company, since renamed, is the Ventus holding company that owns the plant. The power plant lent money to its own shareholder.
Sources: https://ventus.energy/uploads/Juglas_Jauda_valuation.pdf; https://ariregister.rik.ee/eng/company/17012252
Document obtained by the author: the plan’s §3.1.3, group structure.
Will the plant get it back? The appraiser took Ventus’s word for it. The report says the client gave an assurance that the loan is fully recoverable, and that it is therefore included in the value. The client is Ventus Energy Group, which owns the borrower. The same report says it values the plant “as a standalone and independent company, without analysing its related companies, including Ventus Energy group”. It took Ventus’s word on the loan anyway. On pages 30 and 31 the loan is added on top of the value of the plant’s future earnings: €38.16 million, less €2.41 million of debt after cash, plus the €0.94 million, makes €36.7 million.
Source: https://ventus.energy/uploads/Juglas_Jauda_valuation.pdf
And who is the borrower? A company with €100 of share capital and one board member, Timma. It has never filed an annual report. The Estonian register lists both 2024 and 2025 as not submitted. So the appraisal counts a debt owed by a €100 Ventus company with no published accounts, and the only support the report gives for its being paid is the word of that company’s owner.
Sources: https://ariregister.rik.ee/eng/company/17012252; https://ventus.energy/uploads/Juglas_Jauda_valuation.pdf
And where does that forecast come from? The appraiser says his value assumes that “the information provided by the Client, in particular on energy capacity and prices, is credible and true”. And who is the client? Of course. Ventus.
Source: https://ventus.energy/uploads/Juglas_Jauda_valuation.pdf
The loan is 2.6% of the €36.7 million. It also shows how the number was made. On page 8 the appraiser also says the plant’s €0.77 million cash balance was not checked against a bank statement. The crypto income is built on the client’s own forecasts. The peak electricity prices rest on an assurance. Jugla is one of only two energy projects in the plan with an independent valuation, and this is what independent looks like here: the appraiser kept writing down what it was told. It says so itself on page 1: it “does not vouch for the accuracy” of the information it analysed, “because it is not its author”. On page 36: the two future scenarios follow guidelines “provided by the Client”, and the appraiser “has not analysed the technical feasibility of these scenarios”.
Documents obtained by the author: Annex 7, valuation entries; Annex 8, independent professional valuations.
Source: https://ventus.energy/uploads/Juglas_Jauda_valuation.pdf
Interbaltija has valued a Ventus plant before. Its valuation of the Dambis plant as at the end of 2022 forecast revenue of €9.03 million for 2023 and €8.13 million for 2024. The plant made €7.10 million and €3.78 million. It forecast operating income of €2.60 million and €2.02 million. The plant reported EBITDA (profit before interest, tax and depreciation) of €1.27 million and €1.06 million. That is a miss of about half, two years running, by the firm behind Jugla’s €36.7 million.
Sources: https://ventus.energy/uploads/Powerhouse_Dambis_appraisal.pdf; https://company.lursoft.lv/en/eco-energy-riga/40103860838, paywalled
Page 8 has one more surprise. At the end of 2025 the plant had €0.94 million out on loan to Ventus and owed €3.18 million itself. The appraiser names two lenders. One is Sergejs Meļohins, a co-owner at the time, with €1.54 million. The other, with €1.63 million, is “Juniflor Africa Flower Trading (Lakomino)”. The appraiser is relaxed about it: the loans are repayable, unsecured and without a specific repayment schedule, and the total is about equal to the plant’s 2025 EBITDA. The public report says nothing about who Juniflor is, when it lent or why. I found no company called Juniflor or Lakomino in Latvia’s company register or in a web search.
Documents obtained by the author: Juglas Jauda’s audited 2025 annual accounts, Lursoft extract of 28 August 2026; Annex 5, p. 2, Jugla row.
Source: https://ventus.energy/uploads/Juglas_Jauda_valuation.pdf
Did a Riga power plant buy €1.63 million of roses? I doubt it. I have no evidence it bought a single stem. A name in an appraisal is all anyone outside Ventus has, and that is the point. The lamp in Ventus’s office, €4,290 at list price, was bad. Investors’ money buying into a power plant that owes €1.63 million to something called Africa Flower Trading, with nobody saying who that is, is “what the actual fuck are you doing with our money?” bad.
Sources: https://www.karsten.me/money/ventus-man-cave/; https://ventus.energy/uploads/Juglas_Jauda_valuation.pdf
One more thing about Jugla. Ventus took the remaining 51% with effect from 26 August 2026, eight days after the court order. The day before, the plant company pledged everything it owns to a company outside the Ventus group, for a debt of up to €1.95 million. The day after, Ventus’s holding company pledged the 51% to the same company. It is the one that holds the pledges over Krustpils. Who paid for that second half, and with what? The register doesn’t say. Either way, a new creditor now sits on Ventus’s best plant, ahead of you.
On top of all that sit about €15 million of senior loans at the plants, the kind that get repaid before anything reaches Ventus. Investors are last in line for assets Ventus only partly has.
Documents obtained by the author: the plan’s §3.2.2; Annex 5; Lursoft ownership records for Juglas Jauda, effective 26 August 2026 and registered 27 August 2026.
Sources: https://www.ametlikudteadaanded.ee/ee/Saneerimisn%C3%B5ustaja%20Kristo%20Teder/saneerimismenetluse-teated/saneerimisteade/2026/8/25/2640998; https://www.lursoft.lv/en/pledge/100217628, paywalled; https://www.lursoft.lv/en/pledge/100217657, paywalled
Krustpils: the landowner and the pledged shares
Krustpils is the plan’s second-biggest gain: €4 million today, €18 million later. The project company, PJ Serviss, doesn’t own the land. It holds a building right, the right to build and keep a plant on someone else’s land, until 25 April 2049. The land belongs to Realto Sidrabe, whose beneficial owner, the person ultimately behind it, is Alvis Krasovskis. Under the Land Register entry, PJ Serviss needs the landowner’s written consent to sell that right or borrow against it. Separately, all 2,800 shares in PJ Serviss are pledged.
Sources: https://www.lursoft.lv/en/land-register, paywalled; https://company.lursoft.lv/en/realto-sidrabe/44103148591, paywalled; https://www.lursoft.lv/en/pledge/100217785, paywalled
Document obtained by the author: Annex 7, Krustpils row.
PJ Serviss’s accounts for 2025 show no turnover, no employees, €1.38 million of borrowings and equity of minus €44,847. The plan says this is worth €4 million today.
Documents obtained by the author: Annex 7, Krustpils entry.
Source: https://company.lursoft.lv/en/pj-serviss/40103644174, paywalled
A plan that repays investors partly from asset sales and refinancing has put €18 million on a project whose building right can’t be sold or mortgaged without Realto Sidrabe signing off, held by a company whose every share already secures somebody else’s claim.
The pledge is recent. My transcription of the commercial pledge register shows security over PJ Serviss’s assets and shares, in favour of a company outside the Ventus group, first registered on 21 July 2026 and replaced by new ones on 4 September. The first date is eleven weeks after Bafin ordered Ventus to repay German investors and nine days before Ventus filed for reorganisation. A pledge works like a mortgage on a house: the lender has a claim on the thing until the debt is paid. The shares still belong to the Ventus group. But if PJ Serviss is ever sold, whatever that claim amounts to is paid before anything travels up to investors.
Source: https://www.lursoft.lv/komerckilas/40103644174?l=en, paywalled
Documents obtained by the author: the plan’s §§3.3.1 and 4.1; Annex 7, Krustpils entry; the land-register extract for the Krustpils building right.
Three days after the replacement, Timma left PJ Serviss’s board. Jansons had gone in August. The only director left also runs a company at the pledge holder’s address. The pledge holder is a construction company, and PJ Serviss owed its suppliers €1.12 million at the end of 2025. So a man from the pledge holder’s address now decides who gets paid first. Only Ventus’s own holding company could have appointed him, and on paper it could vote him out again. Did Ventus choose this, or did the loan terms demand it? The plan doesn’t say. It still counts Krustpils as Ventus’s to sell, at €4 million today and €18 million later. By the look of it, control has moved to the lender, and half of that move came after the court order.
Documents obtained by the author: Lursoft register extracts and 2025 annual accounts for PJ Serviss, the pledge holder and the director’s other company; Annex 7, Krustpils entry.
Source: https://company.lursoft.lv/en/pj-serviss/40103644174, paywalled
Krasovskis and Jānis Timma, Ventus’s 65% shareholder and a management board member, have history. Crowdestate’s old Olaine listing named Krasovskis as a 45% shareholder and Timma as a consultant with an option on 25%. So what does PJ Serviss pay Realto Sidrabe for the building right, and on what terms does Realto Sidrabe give its consent? The title records are silent on both.
Sources: https://ariregister.rik.ee/eng/company/16964065/Ventus-Energy-Group-O%C3%9C; https://crowdestate.eu/it/opportunity/olaines-energija-sia; https://www.lursoft.lv/en/land-register, paywalled
Timma has sold this ending before
In 2021 Timma raised €276,392 in 285 investments on Crowdestor for an energy holding. The first target was a set of gas-fired plants in Olaine. The pitch: collect plants, then sell the holding to a strategic investor at eight times earnings, for a projected €60.7 million. No sale was ever reported and no payout to those investors is documented. The Olaine holding company was declared insolvent in August 2025. Crowdestate, whose investors had lent against the same plants, took Timma to court over his personal guarantee.
Source: https://www.karsten.me/money/ventus-founder-janis-timma-sued-over-bankrupt-energy-deal/
The Crowdestate listing said the three Olaine plant companies were bought in early 2018 for €3.5 million, through a company 45% owned by the same Alvis Krasovskis whose company now owns the land under Krustpils. In August 2026 the insolvency administrator put those three companies up for auction, together with €295,248 they owe their parent. Opening price: €900,000. The auction closed on 3 September with no sale price recorded.
Documents obtained by the author: copies of the Crowdestate listing saved by two investors; auction notice MPA/5161/2026-EIS on Latvia’s electronic auction site, saved on 27 September 2026.
Source: https://crowdestate.eu/it/opportunity/olaines-energija-sia
What was the Crowdestate investors’ money for? The listing says it openly: to “refinance” the shareholders’ loan. In plain words, investors were asked to put in €500,000 so it could be paid out to the main shareholder’s own company. That is wiring money to the owner’s bank account with one extra step. Was it insane that anyone signed off on that in 2019? Totally. Those are the people we’re dealing with, retail investors and platform owners alike. Timma was the consultant on that deal and gave a personal guarantee, €100,000 by his own account. That is what Crowdestate is suing him over. In March the listing showed more than eleven times that owed on the loan.
Documents obtained by the author: a copy of the Crowdestate listing; a statement from Timma’s side of March 2026.
I am not telling you money was stolen in Olaine. I can’t tell you where it went. No payout to those investors is on record.
Ventus’s best scenario depends on selling or refinancing a heat portfolio for about €60 million. Ask the people behind those 285 investments how that goes.
Document obtained by the author: the plan’s §§7.3.1 and 11.2.
Source: https://www.karsten.me/money/ventus-founder-janis-timma-sued-over-bankrupt-energy-deal/
Where did the money go, and who gets it back?
By Ventus’s own count, lenders deposited about €82.1 million, part of it since repaid, and its project list shows €80.0 million of loans to its project companies. In a forced sale, on its own valuations, its liquidation model turns those into €56.8 million: 71 cents per euro on that list, 95 cents per euro of the €59.7 million of loans in its asset list, 68 cents per euro of the €83.9 million lenders are owed.
Document obtained by the author: the plan’s §7.1.2; Annexes 1, 2, 5 and 7.
I added up Ventus’s own asset list. As at 30 June 2026 it shows €59.7 million of loans and €5.3 million of interest still owed on them: €65.0 million. The project list says €80.0 million as at 13 June, and its footnote calls that “the Company’s loans to the project companies”. Seventeen days apart, €15.0 million apart. One list sorts the money by project. The other names the companies that borrowed it. The plan has no line that reconciles the two. One reading would close the gap. The €80.0 million may be what Ventus owes lenders on each project, unpaid interest compounded in, and not what it lent. Its statistics page points that way: €98.1 million of “Mezzanine Loans” less €14.2 million “Repaid to Lenders” is €83.9 million, the plan’s figure for lender claims at the end of August. That is my arithmetic, not Ventus’s statement. The plan calls the €80.0 million the Company’s loans to the project companies, twice. If the label is right, the asset list is €15.0 million short. If it is wrong, a restructuring plan mislabels its largest number. Its long explanation of book value against market value is about something else. By 31 August the balance sheet has €59.9 million of loans and shareholdings. Is that supposed to tell lenders where their money went?
Document obtained by the author: the plan’s §3.2.1; Annexes 1, 2, 5, 7 and 8.
Source: https://ventus.energy/en/statistics
Your claim is against Ventus. Ventus’s claims are against its own project companies. Timma and Jansons run Ventus, and one or the other sits on the boards of several of its borrowers. That is the first pile: the plants. The second is every claim Ventus might have over money it has already paid out: to the sellers of its assets, to connected companies, to its own managers. Was Atlasa bought and built at fair prices? Who received the money lent to Atlasa? Did Ventus pay its board members’ companies anything, and if so what for? If a price was inflated or a payment went to an insider without good reason, getting it back is an asset too.
The plan counts the first pile and ignores the second. Its 29 pages contain no provision for anyone to examine what Ventus paid for its assets or whom it paid.
Document obtained by the author: the plan’s §§9–10 and 13; Annex 5.
Estonian tax data shows €4.87 million of turnover on Ventus’s VAT returns, about 6% of everything investors paid in, with almost no VAT paid on it. That is what services billed across borders look like. Who billed whom? For 2026 the plan gives part of the answer. In the eight months to August, Ventus took in €1.45 million as “the subsidiaries’ contributions to the group’s overheads”. The tax board’s two figures for 2026 so far come to €1.13 million. Ventus’s advertising bill for all eight was €251,036. So this year the turnover fits Ventus billing its own project companies, not promoters billing Ventus. And what do project companies pay with? Six of the twelve in the table above lost money last year. A company with no profit has little to pay its parent with except what its parent lent it. Does your money go down as a loan and come back up as an invoice? What doesn’t come back up is interest. The same accounts show none received from the subsidiaries, on loans Ventus says have earned it €7.5 million.
For 2024 and 2025 the plan gives no accounts, and €3.74 million of the turnover falls in those two years. I can tell you what two people around Ventus took in last year. Lars Wrobbel’s blogging business billed €585,681 to companies in other EU countries. The CEO’s company took in €574,819. Neither names its customers. That money could have come out of the 6%. Or it came from somewhere else, and the 6% went somewhere else altogether. Ventus’s books would answer it. The plan opens none of them.
Documents obtained by the author: the plan’s §3.2.1; Annex 2; 2025 annual accounts of Lars Wrobbel e.K.; 2025 annual accounts of WIN WIN Investments, Lursoft extract.
And who would bring such a claim? In a reorganisation the company keeps control of its own assets, so any such claim is the company’s to bring. The company is run by Timma and Jansons. The law tells the adviser to check that the company’s transactions serve a purpose. The plan adds no review of past deals and no way to recover anything. Is Ventus going to sue itself?
Source: https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/akt/501122025005
Document obtained by the author: the plan’s §2.1.
The supervision on offer doesn’t fix that. The reorganisation adviser, who prepared the plan together with Ventus, supervises its performance for a fee set by the court and carried by the company. The new Supervisory Council has five members. Management appoints two with the adviser’s consent, Ventus’s own law firm appoints one, and creditors elect two. Its opinions are advisory. Timma, Jansons and WIN WIN Investments are also creditors under the plan and vote on it as a separate class. Three of the five seats are filled by Ventus’s side. That is supervision by invitation.
Is the adviser objective? The law demands it: he must be independent of Ventus and inform creditors “in an impartial and competent manner”. Now look at how he is paid. If this plan fails, he can bill his hours. Say he worked on nothing else from his appointment on 18 August to the vote on 12 October: 312 hours. At €140 an hour, the rate a court recorded for him in 2024, that’s €43,680.
If the plan is approved, Estonia’s fee scale runs to 2.25–2.6% of what the plan promises to repay: between €1,475,161 if only principal comes back and €2,181,147 if interest does too. €43,680 if the plan fails. On paper, €1,475,161 at the scale’s minimum if it passes. A court can go lower. Then up to a fifth of that again for every year he supervises it. Over five years that can bring the total to between €2,950,323 and €4,362,294.
All of it paid by Ventus, on whatever terms he and Ventus agree between themselves. The court starts from their deal and steps in only if it clearly harms creditors. The plan shows you no deal and no number. Lenders, all 6,136 of them, are due €675,000 by the end of 2027. You can decide how objective a scale like that makes a man.
Documents obtained by the author: the plan’s §§6.3, 7.1.1 and 9; Annex 4.
Sources: https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/akt/501122025005; https://www.riigiteataja.ee/akt/101072022028; https://www.riigiteataja.ee/kohtulahendid/detailid.html?id=364453119
And look who keeps getting paid. White Label Solution kept 61 cents of every euro it billed last year: €457,000 profit on €752,000. Ventus told me its staff sit in sister companies like this one. The plan exempts the contracts that keep the daily business running, platform and intra-group services included: paid in full, in the ordinary course, while your money is frozen. It budgets about €1.9 million a year for overheads, and overheads get paid first. It names no contractor and no price.
Documents obtained by the author: 2025 annual accounts of White Label Solution, Lursoft extract; Ventus’s written answers to the author, November 2025; the plan’s §§6.3, 7.2.8 and 11.1.
And who is voting? Votes are counted in euros. 135 creditors hold 27% of them, an average of €170,000 each. Who are they? Ventus knows. Its law firm knows. You don’t. And the plan’s insider list has three names on it: Timma, Jansons and the CEO’s company. White Label Solution, one of the companies Ventus says its staff sit in, belonged to Timma and the CEO’s company, half each, until they transferred their shares to the CMO four days after the Bafin announcement. If it lent Ventus money through the platform, it now votes with the retail investors.
Documents obtained by the author: Annex 6; the plan’s §§6.2–6.3, 7.2.8 and 9; Lursoft register records for White Label Solution.
Source: https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/akt/501122025005
Lars Wrobbel’s review shows a Ventus-branded slide promising “first rank mortgages and pledge on group shares”. The restructuring plan says no investor claim is secured by anything. There are mortgages and pledges on Ventus’s plants. They belong to senior lenders and to an outside company that took security over Krustpils nine days before the filing, and over Jugla days after the court order. Everyone but investors. So who was holding the security investors were promised? Ventus’s chief legal officer. He was also the “security agent”: the attorney who is supposed to hold the mortgages and pledges on behalf of investors and enforce them if Ventus doesn’t pay. He has disappeared from Ventus’s team page, and his LinkedIn profile doesn’t mention that he ever worked there. Somebody suing Ventus’s management should ask him one question: did he ever hold a mortgage or pledge for retail investors, and if so, which one?
Documents obtained by the author: the plan’s §3.2.2; Gvido Bajārs’s LinkedIn profile as shown on 7 October 2026; Lursoft commercial-pledge records for PJ Serviss, as transcribed on 10 September 2026; Lursoft commercial-pledge extracts for Juglas Jauda.
Sources: https://ventus.energy/en/about-us; https://archive.li/2025.11.25-163444/https://passives-einkommen-mit-p2p.de/en/ventus-energy-review/; https://www.ametlikudteadaanded.ee/ee/Saneerimisn%C3%B5ustaja%20Kristo%20Teder/saneerimismenetluse-teated/saneerimisteade/2026/8/25/2640998; https://www.lursoft.lv/en/pledge/100217628, paywalled; https://www.lursoft.lv/en/pledge/100217657, paywalled
Is Estonia even the right court?
A restructuring belongs in the country where the company has its centre of main interests: the place where it runs its affairs on a regular basis, in a way outsiders can see. The registered office counts only until somebody proves otherwise. That is EU law, and it covers Estonian reorganisation proceedings.
Source: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2015/848/oj/eng
So where does Ventus run its affairs? Ask the Estonian police. On 24 August 2026, six days after the Harju court opened this restructuring, the Police and Border Guard Board declined to investigate a report I had filed about Ventus. Its reason: this is not Estonia’s case. The notice lists what Ventus doesn’t have in Estonia. No physical office. No employees. No payroll taxes. No Estonian-language service. No Estonian-directed investors. No Estonian projects. It describes a virtual-office address in Tallinn and management working in Riga, and it points to Latvia. The police did not just take my word for it. The notice cites the commercial register and the tax authority for the missing employees and payroll taxes, and says the officer reviewed Ventus’s website.
Document obtained by the author: Estonian Police and Border Guard Board notice 26230101295 of 24 August 2026.
I am not publishing the notice itself, because the police marked it for internal use. Its full reference is: Politsei- ja Piirivalveamet, teatis kriminaalmenetluse alustamata jätmises nr 26230101295, 24.08.2026, reference 3.2-1/28788-2. The notice says the same decision goes to Ventus.
Document obtained by the author: Estonian Police and Border Guard Board notice 26230101295 of 24 August 2026, pages 2 and 4.
The rest of the record points the same way. The commercial register shows no employees. Nearly all the plants are in Latvia and Lithuania. A Latvian design magazine ran a three-page feature on the Ventus office in Riga in June and wrote that about twenty people work there every day. One Estonian authority looked at Ventus and found nothing Estonian about it. In the same month another one took charge of its restructuring.
Sources: https://ariregister.rik.ee/eng/company/16964065/Ventus-Energy-Group-O%C3%9C; https://www.ametlikudteadaanded.ee/ee/Saneerimisn%C3%B5ustaja%20Kristo%20Teder/saneerimismenetluse-teated/saneerimisteade/2026/8/25/2640998
Documents obtained by the author: DEKO magazine, June 2026; the plan’s §§3.1.3 and 3.2.2; Estonian Police and Border Guard Board notice No. 26230101295 of 24 August 2026.
The court had to examine its own jurisdiction and say what it rests on. Any creditor may challenge the opening decision on that ground. I don’t know what the Harju court wrote, or whether the time for a challenge has run out. A creditor can get the ruling from the court file.
Source: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2015/848/oj/eng
The case for bankruptcy
Ventus says bankruptcy is the worse deal. Its own plan puts the bankruptcy payout at 62.1% of claims after five to eight years, 53.9% in today’s money. Look at what that estimate leaves out. It counts plants, cash and half of the money Ventus is owed. It has no line for money clawed back from insiders, none for claims against management, and none for anything recovered from the people who sold Ventus its assets. Here is what a bankruptcy adds that this plan can’t.
Document obtained by the author: the plan’s §§10.2–10.4; Annex 5.
Somebody who is paid to find money. A bankruptcy trustee’s fee is a share of what he actually brings into the estate, clawbacks included, and the court fixes it at the end. The reorganisation adviser’s fee scale works on what the plan promises to repay. One is paid for results. The other is paid for a document.
Sources: https://www.riigiteataja.ee/akt/114032025017; https://www.riigiteataja.ee/akt/101072022028
An outsider collecting what Ventus is owed. Ventus’s assets are loans: €59.9 million of loans to and stakes in its project companies on its 31 August balance sheet, €80.0 million by its project list, plus €7.47 million of interest it has booked and never received. Timma and Jansons run Ventus, and one or the other sits on the boards of several of its borrowers. A trustee is an outsider. He can demand repayment, see where the money went next, and enforce.
Document obtained by the author: the plan’s §3.2.1; Annexes 2 and 7.
Deals can be undone. The short version: deals with insiders that knowingly hurt creditors can be undone five years back, and the insider is presumed to have known. The detail: in an Estonian bankruptcy a court can void transactions that harmed creditors. The window, counted back from the interim trustee’s appointment, is one year if the other side knew or should have known, three years if the company acted knowingly and the other side knew or should have known, and five if the company acted knowingly and the other side was a “close person”. For close persons, knowledge is presumed. Payments to them in the last two years can be reversed unless it is shown that the company was solvent at the time and not made insolvent by the payment. Who is a close person? Board members. Shareholders with more than 10%. Subsidiaries and their board members. Anyone with a significant common economic interest. At Ventus that covers Timma, Jansons, WIN WIN Investments, every project company Ventus controls and the company that holds the influencers’ 15%. Ventus launched in 2024, so every deal it ever made with them is inside the five-year window today.
Documents obtained by the author: the plan’s §§2.1, 3.1.1 and 3.1.3; saved Estonian register records for Ventus Electricity and Heat Jugla and Ventus Employee and Partnerships Stock Options.
Sources: https://www.riigiteataja.ee/akt/114032025017; https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/akt/501122025005
So can pledges. Security handed over in the six months before an interim trustee is appointed, for a debt that already existed, can be voided, if the company wasn’t obliged to give it or was already insolvent and the lender knew or should have known. The Krustpils pledges are dated nine days before Ventus filed. They were given by the project company and the holding company above it, not by Ventus itself. So Ventus’s trustee can’t undo them directly. Those two companies would have to go insolvent themselves, and their own trustee would do it. Ventus’s plan says a bankruptcy of the parent brings the project companies down with it. It means that as a threat. It also means a trustee gets to those pledges. Latvia’s Insolvency Law lets an administrator attack deals that cost the company money: any from the last four months, and three years back if the other side knew.
Sources: https://www.riigiteataja.ee/akt/114032025017; https://likumi.lv/ta/id/214590-maksatnespejas-likums
Documents obtained by the author: the plan’s §§4.1 and 10.2; Lursoft commercial-pledge records for PJ Serviss, as transcribed on 10 September 2026.
The clock. Claims against board members for damage they caused the company expire after five years, unless the articles or a contract say otherwise. Ventus launched in 2024. The plan runs to October 2031. Do the sum: a claim over a deal from 2024 would expire in 2029, two years before the plan ends. Under the plan, the company decides whether to bring those claims, and the company is Timma and Jansons. On paper a creditor can bring them too, if the company can’t pay him. Try proving that while a court-approved plan says you’ll be paid in 2031. In a bankruptcy the trustee brings them, even if the company has waived them or settled. The Reorganisation Act extends the clawback periods by the length of the reorganisation. I found nothing in it that stops this five-year clock. Ask a lawyer before you rely on that.
Documents obtained by the author: the plan’s §7.2.1; Annex 4.
Sources: https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/akt/501122025005; https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/ee/509012023001/consolide/current
What a yes vote locks in. If the plan is approved and Ventus goes bankrupt later anyway, reasonable and necessary payments made in line with the plan can’t be clawed back just because they hurt creditors. The law names fees for professional advice on the plan specifically. So five years of exempt service contracts, and the adviser’s fee, can get that shield the day the court signs off: a trustee can no longer undo them just for hurting creditors.
None of this guarantees a cent. Bankruptcy is slow and ugly. But it is the only version of events in which somebody independent is paid to ask where €82 million went.
Documents obtained by the author: the plan’s §7.1.2.
Source: https://www.riigiteataja.ee/akt/114032025017
The only crime in this plan is one against Ventus
The plan mentions criminal proceedings once. They are in Estonia, over “reputational and cyber attacks”, and the company is “the injured party”. That’s it. Ventus, victim.
Document obtained by the author: the plan’s §3.3.1.
Here is what it leaves out. Bafin’s order is about taking deposits without a licence. In Germany that is a crime with up to five years in prison.
Sources: https://www.bafin.de/SharedDocs/Veroeffentlichungen/DE/Verbrauchermitteilung/unerlaubte/2026/meldung_2026_05_18_ventus_energy_group.html; https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/kredwg/__54.html
In Lithuania, the Kaunas Regional Prosecutor’s Office joined my report on Ventus, Timma and Jansons to pre-trial investigation No. 01-1-21983-26, for money laundering. Its letter says an investigation is being conducted into what I reported. It names no suspect.
Document obtained by the author: Kaunas Regional Prosecutor’s Office, letter No. IBPS-S-465068-26 of 19 August 2026.
In Latvia, the State Police’s economic-crime department added my report on Ventus to criminal proceeding No. 18160003926. That case was opened on 6 July 2026 for aggravated fraud and aggravated money laundering. The notice doesn’t say who it is about, and I can’t tell you it is Ventus. I can tell you the police read a report about Ventus and put it in that file. The Estonian police declined mine because, they say, this is Latvia’s case.
Documents obtained by the author: Latvian State Police notice No. 20/2/3/2-CAnos/44724 of 18 August 2026; Estonian Police and Border Guard Board notice No. 26230101295 of 24 August 2026.
As far as I know, nobody has been charged with anything. My reports reached police and prosecutors in two countries. Inside the restructuring, nobody is looking at all.
Documents obtained by the author: Kaunas Regional Prosecutor’s Office, letter No. IBPS-S-465068-26 of 19 August 2026; Latvian State Police notice No. 20/2/3/2-CAnos/44724 of 18 August 2026.
A restructuring doesn’t stop a criminal case. The Act says criminal court proceedings are not paused, and assets seized for possible confiscation stay seized. And if the company is convicted of a bankruptcy offence after the plan is approved, the court must cancel the plan. Your claim comes back in full, minus what you were paid.
Source: https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/akt/501122025005
A bankruptcy puts someone in charge who has to report crimes. If it turns out the company did something that looks like a crime on its way into insolvency, the trustee or the court must report it to the prosecutor or the police. The trustee’s reports have to say whether a criminal act caused the insolvency. I found no such duty for a reorganisation adviser. Under this plan, looking for crimes is nobody’s job.
Sources: https://www.riigiteataja.ee/akt/114032025017; https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/akt/501122025005
Who was paid what to promote Ventus is in Ventus’s books. Under the plan, those books stay with Timma and Jansons. In a bankruptcy a trustee has them, the creditors’ committee can inspect his file, and anything that looks criminal goes to a prosecutor. If you ever want your money back from the person who talked you into this, that is where the evidence is.
Documents obtained by the author: the plan’s §§2.1 and 9–10.
Sources: https://www.riigiteataja.ee/akt/114032025017; https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/akt/501122025005
The people reassuring you about this plan
Two of the people reassuring investors about this plan are Aleks Bleck of Northern Finance and Lars Wrobbel. Before you take comfort from either of them, look at what they have riding on it.
Both own part of Ventus, through the company that holds 15% of it. That alone should have disqualified them as reviewers. But the shares aren’t why they want this plan: the plan bans any payout to shareholders until lenders are paid. Look at the books. In a bankruptcy, a trustee goes through them and finds out who was paid to promote Ventus, and how much. Under this plan, they stay with the same management. And as long as the plan is running, nobody has officially lost a cent, so nobody comes asking what the promoter who recommended Ventus owes them.
Documents obtained by the author: the plan’s §§7.2.7, 10.4 and 11.6.
Sources: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wZF92kltTrE; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WNT7gA6zjJQ; https://ariregister.rik.ee/eng/company/17067652/VENTUS-Employee-and-Partnerships-Stock-Options-O%C3%9C
Then there is the money. Wrobbel’s blogging business reported revenue of €343,044 for 2024. For 2025, Ventus’s first full year, it reported €608,629. That is 77% more. The accounts name no customers, so I can’t tell you how much came from Ventus. I can tell you that the man explaining this plan to you took in 77% more while Ventus was collecting your money.
Source: https://www.handelsregister.de/
Document obtained by the author: 2025 annual accounts of Lars Wrobbel e.K., filed with the commercial register at Amtsgericht Gütersloh under LALI Capital GmbH, HRB 14602.
And the “skin in the game”? Ventus offered to pay for it. I have the terms of a deal Ventus offered a promoter. Ventus pays an upfront fee. The promoter then invests part of that fee in Ventus, and the payments can be timed to match. The fee is bigger than the stake. So the money on the line is not the promoter’s. It is Ventus’s, which means it is yours. Every promoter who took that deal sends his followers portfolio updates and lets them think it is his own cash at risk. Ventus even wanted most of it left in, because pulling it out early would look odd to investors.
Document obtained by the author: a Ventus collaboration offer.
This is not a theory. One promoter, Thomas Butz, said on his own podcast in December 2024 that Ventus supplied €1,000 of his first €2,000. He says he was open about it, and on that podcast he was. He is a small fish, and he said so out loud. What did the big ones get, and did they tell you? How did that documentary put it? “Everyone Is Lying to You for Money.”
Source: https://p2pcafe.podigee.io/103-jubilaumsfolge-p2p-cafe
Bleck cast his yes vote on camera. In the same video he told viewers that repayment depends on which power plant they funded. The plan says payments are split in proportion to principal, regardless of project. He voted for a plan he hasn’t understood, and he is telling you about it anyway.
Document obtained by the author: the plan’s §§7.1.1 and 7.1.4.
Sources: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wZF92kltTrE&t=372s; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wZF92kltTrE&t=690s
Vote no. Submit a reasoned position. Prepare the court application.
Vote no in the creditor portal. Then email your written position to [email protected] by 12 October and ask for your no vote and your reasons to go into the voting record. Skip the email and, by the official notice, you lose the right to challenge the plan in court.
After the vote comes a separate application to Harju County Court. How to file it, which grounds fit what this article found, and four more ways to stop the plan are in a separate guide: https://www.karsten.me/money/ventus-voting-no-objection-guide/
How does Ventus keep getting away with this?
Easy. The plan puts nobody in charge of checking past payments. When Ventus put its list of claims in front of 6,136 lenders, 62 disputed theirs. Fifty-two of those only wanted the cash stuck in their wallet. Ten raised another objection. That settles how much Ventus owes. It doesn’t build Atlasa, and it doesn’t give RocketBTC a single customer. Ventus can acknowledge every euro it owes you and still hand you a plan built on promises.
Document obtained by the author: the plan’s §4.3.
My number for this plan is 5%. Ventus’s own worst case starts far below that. It owes all of you together €575,000 in the first year, 0.69% of your claims, and it can fall 15% short of that for up to a year without breaching anything. All it has to do is say it will catch up.
Document obtained by the author: the plan’s §7.2.5; Annex 4.
A spreadsheet with a full-repayment ending does not build Atlasa, find RocketBTC’s customers or replace Jugla’s subsidy. It also doesn’t tell you where the money went or send anyone to get it back. Vote no, send your written position by 12 October, and get the court application ready.
Sources: https://ventus.energy/uploads/Juglas_Jauda_valuation.pdf; https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/akt/501122025005; https://www.ametlikudteadaanded.ee/ee/Saneerimisn%C3%B5ustaja%20Kristo%20Teder/saneerimismenetluse-teated/saneerimiskava-projekti-teade/2026/9/24/2653915
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